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NOTE
FEDERAL JURISDICION OVER UNFAIR COMPETITION
The difficulty of defining "unfair competition" has been com-
pared to that of defining "justice."1 This difficulty is founded pos-
sibly upon a reluctance to declare for the benefit of the unscrupulous
trader what acts will be considered unfair, 2 and upon the relation-
ship of unfair competition to the ever-changing field of economics.,
A clear definition of the substantive law of unfair competition has
also been retarded by the fact that it has developed from the law
of trade-marks.4
1. Nims, The Significance of Trade-1'fark and Unfair Competitio~n Law
for the Future, 41 T. M. Rep. 649, 650 (1951). See also 1 Callmann, Unfair
Competition and Trade Marks § 4.3 (2d ed. 1950).
2. See Nims, supra note 1, at 650; Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair
Competition Under the Lanham Act, 38 T. M. Rep. 259, 269-270 (1948).
3. See Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual 168-169 (1947).
4. 1 Callmann, op. cit. supra note 1, § 4.1 at 80; Schechter, Historical
Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks 4 (1925). But see Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 413 (1916) : ". . . the common law
of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition."
The law of trade-marks has recently been codified in the
Lanham Trade-Mark Act,5 and the passage of this Act has induced
many writers to declare that a new "federal law of unfair com-
petition" has been created. 6 Such a creation would have a juris-
dictional rather than a substantive basis,7 and the purpose of this
Note is to determine the effect of the Lanham Act on the juris-
diction of the federal courts over unfair competition.
I. DISREGARDING THE LANHAm Act
A. Pendent Jurisdiction
Unfair competition is a product of the common law,8 and the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in such an action standing alone
must be predicated upon diversity of citizenship and the requisite
jurisdictional amount." Very frequently, however, a claim for unfair
competition exists simultaneously with a federal claim under the
patent, trade-mark or copyright laws. It was not until 1933 that
it was determined, in Hurn v. Oursler,0 that the federal courts
had jurisdiction of a claim of unfair competition joined to a sub-
stantial federal claim. The Supreme Court permitted this joinder
of a nonfederal claim with a federal claim, absent diversity, on the
basis that each was a distinct ground in support of a single cause of
action and not two distinct causes of action.' The difficulty in
the application of this rule has been in determining when the unfair
5. 60 Stat. 427-443, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1051-1127 (1946), as amended 15
U. S. C. §§ 1057(a), 1071, 1122 (Supp. 1952).
6. See I Callmann, op. cit. supra note 1, § 4.1 at 78; Robert, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 169-180; Rogers, Introduction in id. at xi et seq.; Diggins, Federal
and State Regulation of Trade-Marks, 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 200, 208
(1949) ; Ladas, Trade-Mfarks and Foreign Trade, 38 T. Mf. Rep. 278 (1948) ;
Lunsford, Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition-The Demise of Erie v.
Tompkins?, 40 T. f. Rep. 169 (1950) ; March, Unfair Competition Defined,
37 T. M. Rep. 731 (1947).
7. The Lanham Act does not contain substantive law of unfair com-
petition; that will be found in international conventions, see id. at 734-735,
or in the decisions of the federal courts. Diggins, supra note 6, at 211. See also
Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition Under the Lanham Act,
38 T. M. Rep. 259, 271-272 (1948).
8. Id. at 259-264.
9. 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (Supp. 1952) ; see 4 Callmann, op. cit. supra note
1, § 91.2.
10. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933).
11. Id. at 246. The facts pertaining to a claim of unfair competition were
inseparable from those pertaining to a claim of copyright infringement. This
case is particularly interesting because the plaintiffs had amended their action
to include a third claim based upon infringement and unfair competition in the
use of an uncopyrighted version of their play. This nonfederal claim was
dismissed because it was wholly independent of the federal claim of copyright
infringement. Id. at 248. This dismissal of the third claim emphasizes the
Court's limitation of their jurisdiction as to a "separate and distinct non-
federal cause of action."
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competition claim is so related to the federal claim 12 as to constitute
only one "cause of action." This indefinite standard13 has been held,
by the majority of the Second Circuit,1 4 to be complied with for
jurisdictional purposes only where there is a substantial identity of
facts;15 jurisdiction will be denied if the plaintiff "to sustain
the nonfederal claim, must rely on substantial supplemental proof
not relevant to the federal claim.""' Judge Clark of the Second
Circuit has opposed this test and urged a broader interpretation that
would require only a substantial amount of overlapping testimony 7
12. The federal claim must be substantial, but neither the invalidity of
the registration nor the non-infringement by defendant destroy the sub-
stantiality of the federal claim. Ibid. (copyright uninfringed) ; Prince Matcha-
belli, Inc. v. Anhalt & Co., 40 F. Supp. 848 (S.D. N.Y. 1941) (jurisdiction
sustained prior to any adjudication of the federal claim) ; see Sinko v. Snow-
Craggs Corp., 105 F. 2d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 1939) (patent invalid) ; Illinois
Watch Case Co. v. Hingeco Mfg. Co., 81 F. 2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1936) (juris-
diction sustained prior to a final determination of infringement or validity) ;
see American Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F. 2d 472 (6th Cir. 1942)(patent valid but uninfringed). Contra: Atkins v. Gordon, 86 F. 2d 595
(7th Cir. 1936) (Hurn case must have been overlooked) ; see Allen v. Barr,
196 F. 2d 159 (6th Cir. 1952) (invalidity of patent precluded recovery on
the merits rather than denying jurisdiction) ; Weinberg v. Rogers Imports,
Inc., 90 F. Supp. 503 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) (by implication, jurisdiction denied
because of non-infringement).
A problem exists insofar as trade-marks are concerned, for the federal
claim is predicated not on a mere use by defendant but on a use in or affecting
interstate commerce. 60 Stat. 440, 443, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1121, 1127 (1946).
Therefore a claim under the trade-mark laws appears to be unsubstantial
unless defendant's use affects the interstate business of the plaintiff. See
Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 127 F. 2d 6, 7 (2d Cir. 1942) (court ap-
peared to stretch a point to find interstate commerce); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1942) ; see Horlick's Malted Milk
Corp. v. Horlucks Inc., 59 F. 2d 13 (9th Cir. 1932) (decided prior to the
Hur case). Contra: Hemmeter Cigar Co. v. Congress Cigar Co., 118 F.
2d 64 (6th Cir. 1941). However, the federal claim is substantial for jurisdic-
tional purposes although either the trade-mark is invalid, Armstrong Paint
Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315 (1938), or the trade-mark claim
is insufficient because defendant's use was on a different class of goods.
See Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. 2d 272, 274 (2d Cir. 1934).
13. Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal
Procedure, 45 Yale L. J. 393, 397 (1936) ; see Clark, Code Pleading 127-148
(2d ed. 1947).
14. This is an important forum in this field of litigation.
15. Such identity was found to be lacking in Musher Foundation, Inc. v.
Alba Trading Co., 127 F. 2d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 641 (1942)
(unfair competition in the use of a trade-mark joined with patent infringe-
ment) ; Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. 2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
322 U. S. 738 (1944) (unfair competition occurred prior to creation of a
federal cause of action) ; Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F. 2d 16 (2d Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 660 (1940) (unfair competition in the use of
a design not covered by federal registration). See 4 Callmann, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 1925 n. 9, for an extensive collection of cases.
16. Zalkind v. Scheinman, supra note 15, at 902.
17. See Musher. Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F. 2d 9,
11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 641 (1942) (dissenting opinion);
Lewis v. Vendome Bags, 108 F. 2d 16, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309
U. S. 660 (1940) (dissenting opinion) ; Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
[V l. 37:268
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or an "identic basic core."'1 This broader test seems not duly
concerned with any constitutional or statutory restraints on federal
jurisdiction but only with the elimination of piecemeal litigation."'
In 1948 Congress by-passed an opportunity to resolve the con-
flict within the Second Circuit when it enacted Section 1338(b) of
the new Judicial Code :20 "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competi-
tion when joined with a substantial and related claim under the
copyright, patent or trade-mark laws." The report2 accompanying
this section indicated a purpose to enact the Hurn case as statutory
authority, but it is unfortunate that the statutory language is just
as vague .-
The recent case of Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp.,23 which
involved a suit for patent infringement and for unfair competition
resulting from a breach of a confidential disclosure,24 appears to
have merged the Second Circuit's conflicting interpretation of the
Corp., 106 F. 2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1939) (concurring opinion) (by implication).
18. Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. 2d 895, 906 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
322 U. S. 738 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
19. Although the problems of federal jurisdiction are fundamentally
legislative problems, should not the needs of practical judicial administration
effect a practical test? See Lewis v. Vendome Bags, 108 F. 2d 16, 20 (2d Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 660 (1940) (dissenting opinion). The majority
of the Second Circuit recognize that the "judicial economy" argument has much
in its favor but felt reflected from the Supreme Court the constraint of con-
stitutional and statutory limitations, see Zalkind v. Scheinman, supra note 18,
at 903; and the rule permitting joinder must yield to the jurisdictional statute.
See Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal
Procedure, 45 Yale L. J. 393, 398 (1936).
20. Title 28 U. S. C. (Supp. 1952).
21. H. R. Rep. No. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. A116 (1946) ; this same re-
port was carried over to H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A119 (1947).
Judge Clark, in Kleinman v. Betty Dan Creations, Inc., 189 F. 2d 546, 551
n. 6 (2d Cir. 1951), 36 Mlinn. L. Rev. 283 (1952), gives a brief history of§ 1338(b), and indicates that this report does not show clearly the full im-
pact of the change intended, as it was written for a conservative preliminary
draft of the statute.
22. "Controversy over the meaning of 'cause of action' has been sup-
planted by confusion over the meaning of 'related claim.'" Note, 20 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 630, 634 (1952).
23. 190 F. 2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 913 (1952).
24. The Schreyer case had distinguished Kleinman v. Betty Dain Crea-
tions, Inc., 189 F. 2d 546 (2d Cir. 1951), 36 Minn. L. Rev. 283 (1952), where
the court had refused jurisdiction of a nonfederal claim for breach of a
patent contract joined to a federal patent claim, as "sounding primarily in con-
tract." Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp., supra note 23, at 924. This distinction
is weak in view of the fact that the theory of recovery in cases involving a
"confidential disclosure" is quasi contractual, Brown, Liability in Submission.
of Idea Cases. 29 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 161, 163-165 (1947), and recently the
court in Telechron, Inc. v. Parissi, 197 F. 2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1952), stated
that, "In our opinion the Betty Dain case was in substance overruled by the
Schreyer decision, since the attempted distinction between them cannot
logically be supported."
The court in the Kleinman case, impliedly indicating that there is a more
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Huri case. The district court 25 had held that it had jurisdiction
over both claims on the basis that Section 1338(b) was drafted
in terms more apt to state the view of Judge Clark than that of
the majority of the Second Circuit and therefore the court was
able to reach a desirable result in view of judicial economy. This
result was affirmed on the basis that the two claims bad a "common
background of basic facts."
Although the Schreyer case appears to have adopted Judge
Clark's interpretation of the Hum rule as the proper meaning of
Section 1338(b) ,26 the application by Judge Clark27 of his "sub-
stantial overlapping testimony" test seems to far exceed the
Supreme Court's application of the Hum rule, and to be more in
line with Callmann's theory that all claims involving the same
"competitive relationship" should constitute "one cause of action"
under the Hurn rule.2 8 Under his theory the Supreme Court
would have found, rather than rejected, jurisdiction of the plain-
tiff's third claim in the Hurn case,29 but Callmann concludes that
there was disparity between the statement of the rule and its
application."0
liberal joinder under § 1338(b) than under the Hurn rule, found § 1338(b)
inapplicable, and refused jurisdiction under the latter on the authority of
General Motors Corp. v. Rubsam Corp., 65 F. 2d 217 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
290 U. S. 688 (1933), which was decided so shortly after the Hunt case as not
to reflect the extension of federal jurisdiction in this field. Although an action
for breach of a patent contract does not arise under the patent laws, Geneva
Furniture Co. v. Karpen & Bros., 238 U. S. 254 (1915); see Rubens v.
Bowers, 136 F. 2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Gate-Way, Inc. v. Hillgren, 82
F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1949), aff'd without opinion, 181 F. 2d 1010 (1950),
jurisdiction may be based on the Hurn rule, United Lens Corp. v. Doray
Lamp Co., 93 F. 2d 969 (7th Cir. 1937) (alternative holding) ; Finnerty v.
Wallen, 77 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Cal. 1948), or on the theory that contract
distinctions should not preclude jurisdiction under § 1338(b). Telechron, Inc.
v. Parissi, supra; see 36 Minn. L. Rev. 283 (1952).
25. 89 F. Supp. 177 (D. Conn. 1950).
26. See Note, 20 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 630, 635-636 (1952).
27. See Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F. 2d 9,
11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 641 (1942) (dissenting opinion). Al-
though the parties and probably the witnesses would be the same, and hence
combining both causes of action into one suit would be economical, any testi-
mony relevant to the unfair use of a trade-mark or trade name would be
completely irrelevant to patent infringement, and under the most liberal
interpretation of the Hum. case Judge Clark's dissent in the M1fusher case
would appear to be erroneous. See Kaplan v. Helenhart Novelty Corp., 182
F. 2d 311 (2d Cir. 1950).
28. 4 Callmann, op. cit. supra note 1, § 91.2(c) at 1931.
29. See note 11 supra.
30. 4 Callmann, op. cit. sufnra note 1, § 91.2(c) at 1930. Callman's ex-
planation is that the Court had to draw the line somewhere, but he has not
considered that such line was in recognition of the limitation of federal
jurisdiction which binds even the Supreme Court.
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The precedent of the Hurn case may make it difficult for the
courts to find that unfair competition resulting from the un-
authorized used of uncopyrighted matter similar to copyrighted
matter is related to the federal claim, under Section 1338(b), al-
though the facts in regard to defendant's use would be identical in
both claims. 3 Such a result would indicate "disparity" between
the jurisdictional limitation of the Hum decision and a liberal inter-
pretation of Section 1338(b), 3 2 insofar as the decision pertains to
a claim of unfair competition. This apparent inconsistency does not
mean either a complete erasure of the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tional line or, alternatively, a strict interpretation of the statute;
for although the inclusion of the word "related" in Section 1338(b),
unless superfluous, retains to some extent the limitation of the Hum
case, it need not preclude a less strict interpretation than the ma-
jority of the Second Circuit has expressed.13
It would seem clear that the intent of Congress was not to ex-
tend federal jurisdiction over any claim of unfair competition
pendent to a claim under the patent, trade-mark or copyright laws,
and that the test of relation now should be "a common background
of basic facts."'3 4 Although this view may be optimistic since courts
have either construed Section 1338(b) strictly 5 or have ignored
it and relied on the Hum case,38 a clear separation of the facts neces-
sary to support each claim and a showing of substantial over-
lapping testimony should outweigh precedents in this field, which
merely recite a "rule."
31. See American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F. 2d 412 (2d Cir.
1941).
32. All of the writers have pointed out the desirability of a liberal inter-
pretation of § 1338(b) to avoid "piecemeal litigation," and that the use of the
word "related" permits a departure from the narrow test of "substantially
identical facts." Moore, Commentary on the U. S. Judicial Code 150 (1949) ;
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 232 (1948) ; Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 424, 430-431(1947).
33. Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. 2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,322 U. S. 738 (1944). It is interesting to note that Derman v. Stor-Aid, Inc.,
141 F. 2d 580 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 323 U. S. 805 (1944), in which the
court found Zalkind indistinguishable, has been overruled. Cutting RoomAppliances Corp. v. Empire Cutting Machine Co., 186 F. 2d 997 (2d Cir.
1951).
34. See Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp., 190 F. 2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U. S. 913 (1952).
35. Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F. 2d 46 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U. S.
819 (1951) ; Rockwell Mfg. Co. v. Evans Enterprises, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 431(W.D. N.Y. 1950).
36. Dubil v. Rayford Camp & Co., 184 F. 2d 899 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Tele-
chron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp.. 97 F. Supo. 131 (D. Del. 1951) ; Weinberg v.
Rogers Imports, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 503 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
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B. Choice of Law
The advent of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,3 7 which purportedly
overthrew many years of well-developed federal unfair competition
law, has been universally reproved by the writers as a catastrophe
in this field. 38 The courts which have considered the problem of the
applicable law have held that state law applies to unfair competition
issues,39 with a few exceptions where jurisdiction was based solely
on the Hur, rule.40 Uniformity of decisions between coordinate
state and federal courts also requires the application of the local
law of conflicts. 41 Such a requirement presents extremely difficult
problems when acts of unfair competition extend over several
states,42 but as a practical matter application has been rare and thus
37. 304 U. S. 64 (1938), 22 Minn. L. Rev. 885.
38. See, e.g., Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1299
(1940); March, Unfair Competition Defined, 37 T. M. Rep. 731 (1947);
Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks and
Unfair Competition, 42 Col. L. Rev. 955, 960-961 (1942); Note, 60 Harv.
L. Rev. 1315, 1316 (1947).
. 39. Unfair competition standing alone--jurisdiction based on diversity:
Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U. S. 666 (1942) ; Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. De Bois Brewing Co., 175 F. 2d 370 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U. S. 934 (1950); Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. Cook Chemical
Co., 85 F. Supp. 257 (W.D. Mo. 1949), modified, 185 F. 2d 365 (8th Cir.
1950) ; Remick Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 57 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.
N.Y. 1944) (court followed decision of New York trial court without dis-
cussion of its merits in spite of a United States Supreme Court decision on
the issue to the contrary).
Unfair competition joined to a federal claim-jurisdiction based also
on diversity: Sunbeam Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 191 F. 2d 141
(9th Cir. 1951) ; Grocers Baking Co. v. Sigler, 132 F. 2d 498 (6th Cir. 1942) ;
Time, Inc. v. Viobin Corp., 128 F. 2d 860 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S.
673 (1942) ; Rytex Co. v. Ryan, 126 F. 2d 952 (7th Cir. 1942) ; National Fruit
Product Co. v. Dwinnell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942) aff'd,
140 F. 2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944) (unfair competition issue not raised on appeal) ;
Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 46 F. Supp.
198 (D. Mass. 1942). But cf. Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F. 2d
663, 671-672 (7th Cir. 1943). The Rytex and Viobin cases, supra, were ex-
pressly overruled in Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., supra, as to other
grounds; no inconsistency on this point is apparent.
40. Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F. 2d 46 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U. S. 819 (1951) ; Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.
1947). But see National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., supra
note 39, at 504; Time, Inc. v. Viobin Corp., supra note 39, at 862; Rytex Co. v.
Ryan, supra note 39, at 954.
41. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941) ; Coca-Cola Co. v.
Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc., 155 F. 2d 59 (4th Cir.) ,cert. denied, 329 U. S.
773 (1946); Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt
& Mfg. Co., 124 F. 2d 706 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 682 (1942) ;
see Zephyr American Corp. v. Bates Mfg. Co., 128 F. 2d 380, 386 (3d Cir.
1942).
42. Skinner Mfg. Co. v. General Foods Sales Co., 52 F. Supp. 432 (D.
Neb. 1943) ; cf. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127, 133-135 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U. S. 838 (1948) ; Kelly v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473,
482-484 (D. Mass. 1948) ; Curley v. Curtis Pub. Co., 48 F. Supp. 29, 30 n. 3
(D. Mass. 1942) ; see Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Multistate Torts:
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has not meant a confusing integration of the substantive law of
several states." The propriety of applying state law and the dilemma
of determining which state's law to apply when the unfair com-
petition is multistate are largely academic problems 44 because
the federal courts for the most part continue to apply federal law;45
either the courts or parties raise no question as to the applicable
law,"4 or federal law is justified on the basis that it is no different
from the state law. 47 This apparent discrepancy between the at-
tachment of the federal courts to Erie v. Tompkins and their de-
pendence upon their own decisions creates uncertainty which must
be resolved.
As a solution it has been suggested that irrespective of the
jurisdictional basis federal law be applied to unfair competition
when it is joined with a federal claim under the patent, trade-mark
Law and Reason Versws the Restatement, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 43-48 (1951)
Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1315 (1947).
43. See Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt
& Mfg. Co., 124 F. 2d 706 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 682 (1942);
Skinner Mfg. Co. v. General Foods Sales Co., s=pra note 42 (follows federal
law). But cf. Hartman v. Time, Inc., supra note 42 (would apply the law of
every state in which occurred a libelous publication).
44. See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omni-
presence of Erie v. Tompkits, 55 Yale L. J. 267, 283 (1946).
45. See Note, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1317 (1947); 36 Minn. L. Rev.
283 (1952).
46. See, e.g., Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Bronze Publications, Inc.,
173 F. 2d 778 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 869 (1949) ; Harris v. Na-
tional Mach. Works, Inc., 171 F. 2d 85 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U. S. 905 (1949) ; California Fruit Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co.,
166 F. 2d 971 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Griesedieck Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing
Co., 149 F. 2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1945); Seven Up Co. v. Cheer Up Sales Co.,
148 F. 2d 909 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 727 (1945) ; N. S. W. Co. v.
XWholesale Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 123 F. 2d 38 (6th Cir. 1941) ; General
Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F. 2d 95 (4th Cir. 1940) ; Sinko v. Snow-Craggs
Corp. 105 F. 2d 450 (7th Cir. 1939); Telechron Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 97
F. Supp. 131 (D. Del. 1951).
47. E.g., Creamette Co. v. Conlin, 191 F. 2d 108 (5th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U. S. 945 (1952); Browning King Co. of New York, Inc. v.
Browning King Co., 176 F. 2d 105 (3d Cir. 1949); Hanson v. Triangle
Publications, Inc., 163 F. 2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 855
(1948) (result the same whether New York, Missouri, or general law ap-
plied) ; Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 162 F. 2d 280 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U. S. 809 (1947) ; American Photograph Pub. Co. v. Ziff-
Davis Pub. Co., 135 F. 2d 569 (7th Cir. 1943); Conde Nast Pub., Inc. v.
Vogue School, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 325 (S.D. N.Y. 1952); B-B Pen Co. v.
Brown & Bigelow, 92 F. Supp. 272 (D. Minn. 1950), aff'd, 191 F. 2d 939
8th Cir. 1951),cert. denied, 343 U. S. 920 (1952).
The following cases applied general federal law on the grounds that no
claim had beet made that local law differed and that the parties had relied
almost entirely on federal law: Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305
U. S. 111, 113 n. 1 (1938); Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 143 F.
2d 895, 897 n. 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 766 (1944) ; J. C. Penney
Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F. 2d 949, 952 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1941).
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or copyright laws. 48 This solution appears forced by the so-called
anomaly of applying two different sources of governing law to
issues which are joined in the same action and which have been
declared so interwined as to be a basis for exceptional federal
jurisdiction under Section 1338(b). Precedent is based upon a line
of cases which form exceptions to the Erie doctrine."" These ex-
ceptions stem from a desire for uniformity in the interpretation
and application of federal legislation, and the prerequisite appears
to be a sufficient statutory framework.50 Thus a distinction is drawn
between "federal common law" and "federal general common
law."' Only the latter was abolished by the Erie decision, while the
former, recognized in the case52 directly following Erie v. Tompkins
and continued to be recognized by the Supreme Court, results
from decisions interpreting and applying a statutory framework. 2
The theory of this solution is strengthened by an assertion that the
Erie doctrine is limited to cases where the only ground for federal
jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship.54
48. This was advanced by plaintiff but rejected in Time, Inc. v. Viobin
Corp., 128 F. 2d 860 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 673 (1942), and was
thoughtfully analyzed by Zlinkoff in his article, Erie v. Tompkins: In Rela-
tion to the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition. 42 Col. L. Rev.
955, 986-990 (1942). Subsequently it was rejected in National Fruit Product
Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942). off'd, 140 F.
2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944) (unfair competition issue not raised on appeal), but
followed in Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F. 2d 46 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U. S. 819 (1951) ; Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.
1947). See also Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F. 2d 795 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 847 (1949) ; Note, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 298,
301-302 (1942). In the following cases federal law was applied without dis-
cussion: N. S W. Co. v. Wholesale Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 123 F. 2d
38 (6th Cir. 1941) ; Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F. 2d 450 (7th Cir.
1939).
49. E.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U. S. 92 (1938) ; D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. Federal Dep. Ins. Co., 315 U S. 447 (1942) ; Prudence Corp.
v. Geist, 316 U. S. 89 (1942) ; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,
317 U. S. 173 (1942) ; Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363
(1943) ; O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F. 2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940) ;
see Note, 43 Col. L. Rev. 837, 861-867 (1943) ; 44 Col. L. Rev. 915 (1944).
50. See Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1946).
51. Giles, Unfair Competition and the Overextension of the Erie Doc-
trinw, 41 T. M. Rep. 1056 (1951) ; Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation
to the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 42 Col. L. Rev. 955,
969-974 (1942).
52. Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U. S. 92 (1938).
53. But see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 367
(1943), holding that rights and duties of the United States on its commercial
paper are governed by federal law, and "[i]n absence of an applicable Act
of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law
according to their own standards."
54. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109 (1945) ; D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. Federal Dep. Ins. Co., 315 U. S. 447, 467 (1942) (con.
curring opinion) ; see Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brood.
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Assuming this solution to be proper, state law would still
apply to unfair competition claims standing alone and in the federal
courts on the diversity of citizenship of the parties, as well as to
cases brought in a state court. Thus, this solution, a half-way meas-
ure, might tend to preclude a complete answer to the need for
national uniformity55 in the whole field of unfair competition.
Further, the fact that unfair competition in many cases would still
be governed by state law appears to nullify any real finding of a
statutory framework sufficient to support this solution as an excep-
tion to the Erie doctrine. State courts determining issues of unfair
competition are not bound by federal decisions, and thus the the
policy 0 of Erie v. Tompkins would seem to apply to those issues
when in the federal courts on any jurisdictional basis.
The recent case of Austrian v. Williams,57 limiting an exception
to the Erie case to a federally derived action, concludes that "[t] he
mere fact that jurisdiction is based upon a federal statute does not
impart to the cause of action a federal derivation... ." Clearly the
Hum rule and its codification, Section 1338(b), did no more than
grant exceptional jurisdiction to the federal courts. There is no
indication that Congress intended the scope of a federal law
of unfair competition to hang upon the uncertain interpretation of
the word "related" in Section 1338(b). Although persuasive, the
argument that "[t] he application of different sources of governing
law to various issues [interwoven] in the same lawsuit will create
endless complications" ' implies that the issues, rather than being
merely joined for the convenience of the parties, are jumbled to-
gether; and if such is the case, it is poor ground in which to nurture
a clear federal law of unfair competition. The law of unfair com-
ing Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L. J. 267, 280-281 (1946),
43 Col. L. Rev. 520 (1943).
55. Two writers have not limited the application of federal law to
unfair competition only when it is pendent to a federal claim, but would
always apply federal law to unfair competition. Bunn, The National Law
of Unfair Competition, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 987 (1949) (concludes that a na-
tional law of unfair competition is found in the Federal Trade Commission
Act) ; Giles, Unfair Competition and the Overextension of the Erie Doctrine,
41 T. M. Rep. 1056 (1951) (believes the field of unfair competition sufficiently
dominated by Congressional legislation that all federal decisions survived
Erie v. Tompkins).
56. Unfortunately, the policy of Erie v. Tompkins is not too clear. See
Zlinkoff, Some Reactions to the Opinion of Judge Wyzanski in National
Fruit Products Co. v. Dwizell-Wright Co., 32 T. M. Rep. 131 (Part I, 1942)
Note. 56 Harv. L. Rev. 298, 302 (1942).
57. 198 F. 2d 697 (1952) ; see 38 Va. L. Rev. 680 (1952).
58. Austrian v. Williams, 198 F. 2d 697, 702 (1952), cert. denied, 73
Sup. Ct. 328 (1953).
59. Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-Ifarks
and Unfair Competition, 42 Col. L. Rev. 955, 988 (1942).
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petition, unless affected by the Lanham Act, is not dominated by
the sweep of a federal statute and should reside in the common
law of the states. To hold otherwise would require a judicial
determination of the relation between the unfair competition claim
and the claim under the patent trade-mark or copyright laws, though
there is diversity of citizenship. This would invoke more uncertainty
than a reliance upon the federal courts' present consistency in
applying federal law.
H. THE EFFECT OF THE LANHAii TRADE-MARx ACT
The Lanham Act 0 is the culmination of many years' effort to
effect new trade-mark legislation,"' and its passage "indeed put fed-
eral trade-mark law upon a new footing."62 There exists, however,
a fundamental conflict as to the proposition that this Act has
created a new federal cause of action for unfair competition. 3 The
basis for this proposition has been an interpretation of Subsection
(i) in combination with Subsections (b) and (h) of Section 44:04
"(h) Any person designated in subsection (b) . . .shall be
entitled to effective protection against unfair competition, and
the remedies provided [herein] for infringement of marks shall
be available sofar as they may be appropriate ...."
." (b) Persons who are nationals of... any foreign country,
which is a party to... [a] convention or treaty relating to trade-
marks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of unfair
competition to which the United States is a party .......
"(i) Citizens or residents of the United States shall have the
same benefits as are granted by this section to persons described
in subsection (b) of this section."
Because foreign nationals by virtue of Subsection (h) have a
60. 60 Stat. 427-443, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1051-1127 (1946), as amended
15 U. S. C. §§ 1057(a), 1071, 1122 (Supp. 1952).
61. Robert, op. cit. supra note 3, at 233-237; H. R. Rep. No. 603, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1943).
62. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F. 2d 176, 178 (2d Cir.).
cert. denied, 338 U. S. 860 (1949).
63. Federal law of unfair competition by virtue of Section 44 of the
Lanham Act (60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1126 (1946)) : Stauffer v. Exley, 184
F. 2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950) ; see Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194
F. 2d 416, 422 (2d Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion) ; Chamberlain v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 186 F. 2d 923, 924 (9th Cir. 1951) ; In re Lyndale Farm, 186
F. 2d 723, 726-727 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ; Lane Bryant, Inc. v. Glassman, 95 F.
Supp. 320, 323 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
Contra: Ross Products, Inc. v. Newman, 94 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. N.Y.
1950) ; Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Gibson Lighter Mfg. Co.. 96
U. S. P. Q. 10 (S.D. N.Y. 1952); cf. Hosid Products Inc. v. Masbach, Inc.,
96 U. S. P. Q. 15, 16 (N.D. N.Y. 1952) (distinguishes Stauffer case supra).
For further discussion, see Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc.,
193 F. 2d 77, 80-82 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Comet
Import Corp., 103 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. N.Y. 1952); Old Reading Brewery,
Inc. v. Lebanon Valley Brewing Co., 102 F. Supp. 434 (M.D. Pa. 1952).
64. 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1126 (1946).
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right of action for unfair competition under the Act, and because
citizens of the United States by virtue of Subsection (i) have the
same benefits as these foreign nationals, it seems to follow logically
that suits by and between United States citizens for unfair com-
petition would come under the Lanham Act.65
However, the clear language of Section 1338(b) of the Judicial
Code,', which was passed two years after the Lanham Act, has
been held to be in direct contradiction to this interpretation. 7 This
argument, that the Act could not have created a federal right of
unfair competition because Section 1338(b) would then be a
nullity, was met in the Ninth Circuit, in Stauffer v. Exley,", by
pointing out that jurisdiction under the Lanham Act is limited to
unfair competition which affects interstate commerce, and therefore
Section 1338(b) applies to unfair competition which does not affect
interstate commerce.
Opposing the Stauffer view on Section 1338(b), it has been
contended 5 that the necessary relationship between an unfair
competition claim and a federal claim, if there is to be a "common
background of basic facts,"70 requires that as a matter of fact the
former affect interstate commerce; but it is conceivable that a purely
local unfair competition claim could be joined with a trade-mark
claim affecting interstate commerce. 7 1 In further support of the
Stauffer case, it has been suggested that a procedural statute prob-
ably would not be interpreted as impliedly nullifying an important
substantive right.7 2
In Ross Products, Inc. v. Newman,7 3 the apparent conflict be-
tween the Lanham Act and Section 1338(b) was adjusted in a
65. See 1 Callman, op. cit. supra note 1, § 4.1 at 78; 4 id. § 91.2;
Robert, op. cit. supra note 3, at 169-180; Rogers, Introduction in id. at xi
et seq.; Diggins, Federal and State Regulation of Trade-Marks, 14 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 200, 207-208 (1949); Ladas, Trade-Marks and Foreign
Trade, 38 T. M. Rep. 278, 288 (1948); Lunsford, Trade-Marks and Unfair
Competition--The Demise of Erie v. Tompkins?, 40 T. M. Rep. 169 (1950);
March, Unfair Competition Defined, 37 T. M. Rep. 731 (1947); Rogers,
New Concepts of Unfair Competition Under the Lanham Act, 38 T. M. Rep.
259 (1948).
66. Title 28 U. S. C. (Supp. 1952).
67. Ross Products, Inc. v. Newman, 94 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. N.Y.
1950).
68. Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F. 2d 962, 964-965 (9th Cir. 1950).
69. 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1209, 1211 (1951).
70. See the discussion on pendent jurisdiction based on the Hum rule
and § 1388(b), notes 8-36 supra and text thereto.
71. This presupposes that the trade-mark claim must affect interstate
commerce to come under § 1338(b). See note 12 supra.
72. 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1209, 1211 (1951).
73. 94 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. N.Y. 1950)
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different manner. In holding that the Lanham Act had not created
a federal unfair competition cause of action, the court assumed that
the Lanham Act remedies for trade-mark infringement were avail-
able to claims of unfair competition when in the federal courts on
other jurisdictional bases. It is difficult to conceive, however, that
the language of Subsection (i) is sufficient to give citizens of the
United States in cases of unfair competition the remedies of Sec-
tion 3274 of the Lanham Act but not federal jurisdiction under
Section 39.75
Attempts have been made"6 to limit the Stauffer decision to the
protection it afforded to a trade name under Section 44(g), which
provides that "[t]rade names . . . of persons described in sub-
section (b) . .. shall be protected ... ." But it is incredible that the
rights of citizens under Subsection (i) could be limited to Sub-
section (g) and not include Subsection (h). Subsection (i) clearly
grants to citizens all the benefits of Section 44.
The argument that Section 1338(b) of the Judicial Code con-
stitutes the latest expression of Congressional intent and overrides
the earlier Lanham Act is not entirely sound, for the passage of
Section 1338 (b) cannot be held to have indicated a clear expression
of intent on this problem. In 1948, the idea of a federally created
right of unfair competition under the Lanham Act, although it had
been proposed,'7 7 was not well known, 7 and federal jurisdiction was
held by the courts to be dependent either upon a showing of
diversity or the Hurn rule; as has been discussed,79 Section 1338 (b)
was a statutory development of the Hurn rule. Section 1338(b)
might be a factor should it be determined that the Lanham Act has
created a new law of unfair competition, but that primary question
concerns the intent of Congress in enacting Section 44(i).
One writer 0 has stated that the words of Sections 39 and 4 4 (g),
(h) and (i) require a finding that the Lanham Act has created a
74. 60 Stat. 437, 15 U. S. C. § 1114 (1946)
75. 60 Stat. 440, 15 U. S C. § 1121 (1946).
76. See In re Lyndale Farm, 186 F. 2d 723 (C.C.P.A. 1951); Hosid
Products, Inc. v. Masbach, Inc., 96 U. S. P. Q. 15 (N.D. N.Y. 1952);
Old Reading Brewery, Inc. v. Lebanon Valley Brewing Co., 102 F. Supp.
434, 438 (M.D. Pa. 1952).
77. This proposition was first clearly presented by Rogers, lntroduc-
tion in Robert, The New Trade-Mark Manual xi-xxi (1947).
78. Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F. 2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950), was the first deci-
sion on this proposition.
79. See notes 20-22 supra and text thereto.
80. Diggins, Federal and State Regulation of Trade-Marks, 14 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 200, 208 (1949).
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federal right of unfair competition and that any other construction
would violate the intent of Congress as expressed in Section 45:
"The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within
the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and
misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered
marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or
territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such corn-
nerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and de-
ception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies,
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to
provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conven-
tions respecting trade-marks, trade names, and unfair competi-
tion entered into between the United States and foreign
nations.""'
However, the hearings and reports on this Act predominantly indi-
cate that the purpose of Section 44 was only to effect the inter-
national conventions referred to in the last portion of that part
of Section 45 quoted above ;s2 it was never conclusive whether these
conventions were self-executing or needed legislative implementa-
tion,-3 although the Supreme Court had held in Bacardi Corp v.
Donenechs that they were self-executing.85 As a result, American
businessmen were not being awarded reciprocal advantages in
foreign countries,"" and foreign representatives had filed protests
with the State Department because of non-compliance by the
United States with the terms of the conventions.8 7 The foreign
parties to these conventions expected Congressional action.
Mr. Rogers, a principal proponent of the Lanham Act, pointed
out in the hearings that the purpose of Section 44 was to implement
our foreign obligations"" and that Subsection (i) was "an attempt
to put the citizen on an equality with the foreigner instead of just
the reverse" because of the "anomaly of this Government giving
[foreign nationals] by treaty and by law . . . greater rights than
81. 60 Stat. 443, 15 U. S. C. § 1127 (1946) (emphasis 'supplied).
82. See 51 Col. L. Rev. 1053 (1951).
83. Callmann, The Nezw Trade-Mark Act of July 5, 1946, 46 Col. L.
Rev. 929 (1946).
84. 311 U. S. 150 (1940).
85. See also Ladas, The Self-Executin9 Character of International Con-
ventions on Industrial Property and Their Effects on Substantive Rights,
31 T. M. Rep. 5 (Part I, 1941) ; Rogers and Ladas, Are Conventions Re-
latinq to Industrial Property Self-Executing?, 30 T. M. Bull. (n.s.) 1 (1935).
86. Callman, The New Trade-Mark Act of July 5, 1946, 46 Col.
L. Rev. 929 (1946) ; see H. R. Rep. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1945) ;
Sen. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946) (no difference in reports).
87. H. R. Rep. No. 1362, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
88. Hearings before House Cornittee on Patents on H. R. 9041, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 195 (1938) (then Section 42).
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it gives to its own citizens.""9 Representative Lanham, chairman at
this hearing, agreed that an unrestricted unfair competition clause
was not desired and that Section 44 should merely implement
the treaties already passed by Congress.Y At a subsequent hear-
ing it was suggested that Subsections (g) and (i) were indefinite
and that it was not understood what protection was being afforded.9 1
This objection was passed over by answering that such was a
treaty matter and "all right. -9 2 In the final hearings on this Act, 3
Miss Robert, who has supported the pro-federal law of unfair com-
petition viewpoint, was asked to enumerate the changes that this
Act would bring about, and she stated that Section 44 "carries out
certain provisions to which we are committed under international
conventions and treaties."94 At this final hearing there was no
mention of Subsection (i).
Certainly the Congressional hearings did not show clearly that
Subsection (i) was creating a radical change in the law of unfair
competition, and it seems entirely unsuitable that such a change
would be hidden in a section of the Trade-Mark Act entitled "Inter-
national Conventions."9 The fact that prior to the Lanham Act
trade-mark law was found in many places was a primary incentive
to its passage, 9 and it is unlikely that Congress would intentionally
create that same confusion in the law of unfair competition.
Furthermore, Section 4597 of the Lanham Act, which purports
to express its purpose, does not support the claim that a federal
unfair competition law is created. Unfair competition is mentioned
twice, first generally and then in regard to the conventions and
treaties. The general statement could well be limited by the specific
prohibitions of Sections 4298 and 4399 which can be classed only
89. Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 4744, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1939) (then Subsection (h)).
90. Id. at 169-171.
91. Hearings before House Committee on Patents on H. R. 102, H. R.
5461, and S. 895, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 237 (1941).
92. Id. at 190.
93. Hearings before Senate Committee on Patents on H. R. 82, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
94. Id. at 25.
95. 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1126 (1946). 1 Callmann, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 4.1 at 80, answers this by stating that it is in line with the tradition
of the seniority of trade-mark law over unfair competition law. But if the
present trend is the "emancipation" of unfair competition, why should the
Lanham Act continue any tradition to obscure it?
96. See any of the following for this first of five purposes of the Act:
Sen. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946) ; H. R. Rep. No. 219, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1945) ; H. R. Rep. No. 944, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939).
97. 60 Stat. 443, 15 U. S. C. § 1127 (1946).
98. 60 Stat. 440, 15 U. S. C. § 1124 (1946).
99. 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125 (1946).
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under the heading "unfair competition." The second reference to
unfair competition in Section 45 is applicable to Section 44 because
only 44 concerns treaties and conventions. This clear separation
of the purpose of the Act respecting Section 44 from the expression
of a general intent to protect persons engaged in commerce from
unfair competition would indicate that Section 44 has not created
a new federal law of unfair competition.
A reasonable interpretation of Subsection (i) is that it allows
a suit by an American against a foreign national in order to equate
their rights under Section 44.100 Thus a resident would not be at a
disadvantage in dealing with a foreigner in the United 'States who
has the benefits of the Lanham Act. A suit between Americans
however, should not be allowed under the Lanham Act. The latter
does not logically follow from the right to sue a foreigner.
CONCLUSION
The advocates of the proposition that the Lanham Trade-Mark
Act has created a new federal right of unfair competition are
primarily interested in extending federal jurisdiction beyond the
limited scope of Section 1338(b) and in resolving the "ubiquitous
problem"1011 of Erie v. Tompkins in a field intimate with interstate
business. This urge to extend federal jurisdiction in the field of unfair
competition is in direct contrast to the present tendency of the federal
courts to refuse to exercise fully the jurisdiction that they are clearly
granted. -0 2 Although the problem of the relationship of issues in
pendent jurisdiction and the uncertainty involving the choice of
law would impel a finding that the Act had indirectly effected a new
federal unfair competition law, federal jurisdiction should be found
in clear constitutional or statutory provisions.
Since the Lanham Act created a new substantive law of trade-
marks only after a long and difficult struggle it would seem that at
this time the creation of a new statutory substantive law of unfair
competition would be extremely difficult. However, it is likely that
Congress, without opposition, could amend Section 1338(b) of the
Judicial Code and grant to the federal courts jurisdiction over all
unfair competition claims affecting interstate commerce. This is
desirable because the federal courts are able to grant more effective
protection and their judges are more familiar with the field of unfair
competition. This grant should be supplemented with an express
100. See 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1209, 1211 (1951).
101. 36 Minn. L. Rev. 283, 286 (1952).
102. See Note, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 46 (1952) passiin.
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right to apply federal law, to solve the problem of Erie v. Tompkins
and to promote uniformity of decisions.
At the present time, however, jurisdiction of the federal courts
over unfair competition must either be predicated upon diversity
of citizenship and the requisite jurisdictional amount or upon
joinder with a related federal claim under the patent, trade-mark
or copyright laws. The case for a federal unfair competition lav
under the Lanham Act appears to be overstated.
